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ABSTRACT
MULTI-LEVEL OPTIMAL DESIGN USING GAME THEORY WITH MODEL
UPDATING BY LOW DISCREPANCY SAMPLING
by

Yanchen Xu
The University of Wisconsin - Milwaukee, 2015
Under the Supervision of Professor Anoop K. Dhingra
The Design of Experiment (DOE) based response surface methodology (RSM) is a
commonly used technique for solving optimization problems. The traditional DOE method
has some shortcomings when used to update the RSM model. This thesis aims to develop
a new DOE technique to solve the model updating problems in design optimization.
Toward this end, a new DOE based RSM method is proposed to solve this problem by
using low-discrepancy sequence method to generate the additional data points needed to
update the model to replace the traditional factor and level based DOE method.
Tested on a couple of numerical example problems, the low-discrepancy sequence
method is seen to be effective not only in solving the model updating problem, but also
more effective and convenient compared to the traditional DOE method.
The second part of this thesis deals with using game theory for solving multi-level
design optimization problems. Based on three basic game modes, the Nash game (which is
also considered as non-cooperative game), cooperative game, and Stackelberg game (a
game between leaders and followers), two solution approaches for Stackelberg game with
multiple leaders and followers are proposed: The Decentralized mode and the Hierarchical
mode. During the research on these two game systems, solution approaches for a third
system namely the Decentralized-Hierarchical model is also addressed in this thesis. It is
ii

seen that the low discrepancy sampling based approaches proposed in this thesis are quite
effective in solving multi-level optimization problems.
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Chapter 1. Introduction
This thesis proposes a new idea to realize model updating while using the response
surface method (RSM) to solve multi-level design optimization problems. The
optimization problems are solved using a game theory based approach.

1.1 Literature Review
Optimal design is defined as one which satisfies all the design requirements and make
the expenses the smallest. In another word, the optimal design is the best solution to the
problem that can be achieved given design requirements.
In practice, to achieve the most effective result frequently requires multiple objectives.
However, designs that make all the objective functions simultaneously minimum in a
multi-objective problem rarely occur, because generally there exist conflicts among the
multiple objectives present in the problem. Often, the decision makers have to choose one
objective or several objectives that they are most concerned with. The multiple objectives
are sometimes coordinated at multiple levels. Research about multi-level optimal design
have been conducted since early 1970s, and many methods have been developed so far.

1.1.1 Global Criterion Method (GCM)
Fa ́ısca et al. (2006) proposed a global parametric programming optimization strategy
for multi-level problems. One year later, Fa ́ısca et al. (2007) developed a global
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optimization approach for the solution of various classes of bi-level programming problems
(BLPP).
Jose et al. (2012) mentioned that the Global Criterion Method was characterized as a
strategy where the optimal solution is found by minimizing a preselected global criterion,
F(x), such as the sum of the squares of relative deviations of individual objective functions
from the feasible ideal solutions.
Several optimization algorithms can be applied to obtain the optimum solution using
a GCM formulation. Genetic algorithm is one approach used to solve the global
optimization problems. Dua and Pistikopoulos (2003) developed different algorithms for
different objective function models.

1.1.2 Goal Attainment Method
In the Goal Attainment Method, goals are set as bi for the objective function 𝑓𝐼 (𝑋), 𝑖 =
1, 2 , … , 𝑘. Also, a weight 𝑤𝐼 is assigned to every objective function to denote the
importance of the ith objective function relative to other objective functions in meeting the
goal bi is considered as the overall objective function. Often the goal bi is found by first
solving the single objective optimization problem [Rao (2009)].
The Goal attainment method was first presented by Gembicki and Haimes (1975).
This method overcame some of the limitations and disadvantages of methods available in
early 1970s. It used vector optimization as a tool for analyzing static control problems with
performance and parameter sensitivity indices.

2

1.1.3 Bounded Objective Function Method
In the Bounded Objective function method, the minimum and the maximum
acceptable achievement levels for each objective function 𝑓𝑖 are specified as 𝐿𝑖 and 𝑈 𝐼 ,
respectively, for 𝑖 = 1, 2, … 𝑘. Then the optimum solution 𝑥 ∗ is found by minimizing the
most important objective function [Rao (2009)].
In this approach, only the most important objective function is minimized and the
other objective functions are considered as constraints. Lower and upper bounds on
acceptable values are set for the other objective functions. Haimes et al. (1971) proposed
the trade-off approach in which the lower bounds are excluded. Goicoechea et al. (1976),
Cohon (1978) developed this approach to obtain feasible solutions.
In many cases, the solutions to multi-objective design problems are not a singleton.
Many other methods such as the Utility Function Method, Inverted Utility Function
Method, Lexicographic Method, Goal Programming Method have been used to find a
single solution from a multitude of possible solutions to a multi-objective optimization
problem.
The following solution approaches are considered methods in this thesis for solving
multi-objective, multi-level problems.

1.2 Response Surface Method (RSM)
Response Surface Methodology is a collection of mathematical and statistical
techniques for empirical model building. By careful use of design of experiments (DOE),
the objective is to construct a response function that is influenced by several independent
variables. The application of RSM for design optimization is aimed at reducing the cost of
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expensive analysis methods and their associated numerical noise. Generally, the structure
of the relationship between the response and the independent variables is unknown. The
first step in the RSM method is to find a suitable approximation to the true relationship.
The RSM has gained acceptance as a popular optimization methods in recent years.
Anjum et al. (1997), Baş and Boyacı (2007), Bezerra et al. (2008) and have applied RSM
as a tool to solve optimization problems in different fields.

Figure 1.1: Response surface sketch

1.3 Low-discrepancy sequence
In statistics, low-discrepancy sequences can be applied as generating algorithms for
testing randomly generated points for use with numerical methods (such as Monte Carlo
simulation). Although these sequences are generated using prescribed relations, these
sequences can be largely viewed as yielding randomly generated points. Pugazhendhi
(2011) reported that the low-discrepancy sequences can be very effective for structural
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reliability estimation, and presented two algorithms generating randomly distributed test
points.

1.3.1 Halton Sequence
The Halton sequence is constructed according to a deterministic method. For example,
a 2D problem uses 2 prime numbers for example a and b corresponding to base points on
X-axis and Y-axis. Both 2 axes generate points from the interval of (0,1). To generate a
Halton sequence, let m be a prime number, and then any natural number k has a unique mdigit representation:
𝑘 = 𝑏0 + 𝑏1 𝑚 + 𝑏2 𝑚2 + ⋯ + 𝑏𝑟 𝑚𝑟

(1.1)

here 𝑏𝑖 ∈ {0,1, … , 𝑚 − 1} for 𝑖 = 0,1 … , 𝑟 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑚𝑟 < 𝑚𝑟+1 . Define the base-m radical
inverse function 𝜙𝑚 (𝑘) as,
𝜙𝑚 (𝑘) = 𝑏0 𝑚−1 + 𝑏1 𝑚−2 + ⋯ + 𝑏𝑟 𝑚−(𝑟+1)

(1.2)

Note that for every k, 𝜙𝑚 (𝑘) ∈ (0,1). Let 𝑝𝑖 be s distinct prime numbers 𝑖 = 1, … , 𝑠 and
then the s-dimensional sequence P is called Halton sequence.
𝑃 = {𝜙𝑝1 (𝑘), 𝜙𝑝2 (𝑘), … , 𝜙𝑝𝑠 (𝑘)}
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(1.3)

Figure 1.2: 2D Halton sequence of 256 points map
It can be seen from Figure 1.2 that the randomly generated points are distributed
quite uniformly throughout the 2D space.

1.3.2 Hammersely Sequence
To generate a Hammersely sequence, let 𝑝𝑖 be s distinct prime numbers 𝑖 = 1, … , 𝑠 and
then the (s+1)-dimensional sequence P is called Hammersely sequence.
2𝑘−1

𝑃 = {(

2𝑁

) , 𝜙𝑝1 (𝑘), 𝜙𝑝2 (𝑘), … , 𝜙𝑝𝑠 (𝑘)}
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(1.4)

Figure 1.3: Hammersely sequence of 256 points map
Once again, Figure 1.3 shows that the Hammersely points are evenly distributed
throughout the 2D space.

1.4 Traditional DOE Method
The DOE Method is a tool widely used in industry. By carefully applying DOE
principles before volume production, the companies can save a lot of money and time.
Many researchers have used DOE Methods to solve design optimization problems as well.
Marston (2000) proposed a DOE based method for solving a pressure vessel optimal design
problem. Ghotbi (2013) discussed this problem and proposed another DOE based method
for solving a two bar-truss optimal design problem.
Traditional DOE Methods include full factorial design, OED (orthogonal
experimental design), CCD (central composite deign), BBD (Box-Benhnken design) etc.
A full factorial experimental design means a design that takes all possible
combinations of its levels across all such factors.
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Figure 1.4: A 3 level full factorial design
A CCD or fractional factorial design with center points, augmented with a group of
axial points (star points) let one estimate curvature of the response curve.

Figure 1.5: A 2 level 3 factor Central Composite Design
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1.5 Game theory approaches in optimal design
In the game theory approach, a multi-level optimization problem is treated as a game
where each player corresponds to an objective function being optimized. Many researchers
(Rao (1987), Lewis and Mistree (1997), Liu (1998), et al.) have demonstrated the idea of
using objective functions as players in a game. The players control a subset of design
variables and seek to optimize their individual payoff.

1.5.1 Nash Game
In non-cooperative game theory, Nash equilibrium is a solution concept of a game
involving two or more players where each player is assumed to know the equilibrium
strategies of the other players, and no player has anything to gain by changing only their
own strategy. If each player has chosen a strategy and no player can benefit by changing
their strategy while the other players keep their unchanged, then the current set of strategy
choices and the corresponding payoffs constitutes a Nash equilibrium. Different algorithms
to solve optimization design problems based on Nash game theory had been developed by
many authors (Koskie and Gajic (2005), Liu (1998), Rao and Freiheit (1991)).

1.5.2 Stackelberg Game
In game theory, a Stackelberg game corresponds to a situation when there is a leader
and a follower in the game. In a Stackelberg game, the leader makes its decisions first, the
follower then makes its decisions according to the leader’s decision to optimize its
objective.
Although much research had been done about optimization design based on a

9

Stackelberg game, most of it has focused on how to model a Stackelberg game, with less
effort devoted to developing algorithms for obtaining Stackelberg game based optimal
solutions. Periaux et al. (2001) developed a genetic algorithm based approach to solve the
Stackelberg game based optimization problems. Ghotbi (2013) developed a sensitivity
approach for solving Stackelberg game based optimization problems.

1.5.3 Cooperative Game
In a cooperative game, all players or several groups of players cooperate with each
other. The players have knowledge of the strategies chosen by other players and collaborate
with each other to find a Pareto-optima solution.
Cooperative game theory has been widely applied to model multi-objective
optimization design problems. Rao et al. (1988) applied cooperative game theory based
approach to solve a vibration optimization design problem. Dhingra and Rao (1995)
proposed a cooperative fuzzy game theoretic approach to multiple objective design
optimization problems. Khan and Ahmad (2008) discussed an energy consumption
optimization design problem based on the cooperative game theoretic concepts.

1.6 Motivation
Although many approaches have been proposed to solve design optimization
problems, some methods still have limitations. For example, when using the traditional
DOE Method, when a design problem has non-linear behavior, in this case the linear
regression of the response surface would not match the true values, so that model updating
may be needed. However, to get a more accurate regression model, more data points are
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needed which means more levels of experimental design are required. The number of
required points increases exponentially as the number of levels is increased. For example,
a three level three factor full factorial experiment requires 33 = 27 points, while a four
level experiment requires 34 = 81 points. This increase in number of data points for model
updating could be very large when the number of levels for a factor increases. This thesis
proposes a new idea of using low discrepancy sequence to add arbitrary number of points
to realize the model updating to improve the accuracy of the resulting RSM model.
The second half of this thesis discusses how to solve two game based scenarioshierarchical and decentralized problems in the context of solution to multi-level optimal
design problems.

1.7 Thesis organization
This thesis is divided into 3 main chapters.
Chapter 2 demonstrates how to utilize the low discrepancy sequence as a new DOE
Method to solve optimal design problems that have been solved by using other approaches
in the past. Comparisons between results obtained using different solution approaches are
presented to demonstrate the feasibility and effectiveness of low discrepancy sequences as
a viable tool for solving multi-level design optimization problems.
Chapter 3 demonstrates how to utilize low discrepancy sequence for model updating
and to solve problems that could be computationally expensive and complicated using the
traditional DOE Methods.
Chapter 4 discusses decentralized and hierarchical multi-level problems, two types of
multi-level design optimization problems. In chapter 4, the thesis also presents application
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of sensitivity based approach, developed by Ghotbi (2013) for solving these two types of
problems. Three numerical examples are presented in chapter 4 with respect to the two
problem modes (Decentralized and Hierarchical) and a third mode which combines the two
previous modes is also presented.
Chapter 5 summarizes the main achievements of this thesis and proposes future
extension of the research work that has been done in this thesis.
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Chapter 2. Application of low discrepancy sequences in
design optimization
This chapter discusses how to utilize low discrepancy sequences as a way to generate
data points for setting up the regression model and use the regression model to find a
solution to optimal design problems.

2.1 Basic idea of multi-level design optimization problems
The design of practical systems involves a large number of elements or subsystems
with multiple-load conditions and large number of design variables and constraints. The
design optimization problem becomes unmanageably large, and the solution process
becomes cumbersome and poses numerical difficulties. In such cases, the design
optimization problem can be broken into a series of smaller problems using different
strategies. The multi-level optimization is a decomposition technique in which the global
problem is reformulated as several smaller sub-problems (one for each subsystem) and a
coordination problem (at system level) to preserve the coupling among the sub-problems
(subsystems).

2.2 Traditional DOE-RSM method
The DOE method has been connected with RSM to find solutions for many
optimization problems arising in engineering. The basic idea of DOE-RSM method is to
design an experiment where the leader design variables are parameters and the follower
design variables are unknowns to generate the response surface to find the solution for the
follower variables as a function of leader variable values, then substitute this result into the
13

objective functions to solve the design optimization problem for the leader.

2.3 Low-discrepancy sequence method
The low-discrepancy sequence method in this thesis is considered to be a new way to
generate the data points and build the response surface. The advantage of the lowdiscrepancy sequence compared to the traditional DOE method is the data points generated
from the low-discrepancy sequence are evenly distributed throughout the solution space so
that often less data points generated from low-discrepancy can build a more accurate
response surface. Besides, the number of data points that traditional DOE-RSM methods
require are fixed. For example, using a full factorial design to build a RS model for a 3
level and 3 factor experiment needs 27 data points, even if using a CCD it is reduced to at
least 15 data points (not including the repeating points at the center). However, there is no
limitation on the numbers of points need for the low-discrepancy sequence method, any
number of data points that is proper can be used for the experiments.
In the process of studying low-discrepancy sequence method, a lot of testing work has
been done, and it was proved that both the Hammersely and Halton sequence are good lowdiscrepancy sequences to generate sample data points. However, an interesting fact was
found that Halton sequence has a great advantage comparing with the Hammersely
sequence. See Table 2.1 and 2.2 for the difference between the sample points generated
from Hammersely and Halton sequence (three columns of each) when 5 and 6 points are
generated using these sequences.
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Table 2.1: Three columns of sample points generated from Halton and Hammersely
sequences of 5 points
Halton sequence (5 points)

Hamersely sequence (5 points)

Column 1

Column 2

Column 3

Column 1

Column 2

Column 3

0.5000

0.3333

0.2000

0.1667

0.5000

0.3333

0.2500

0.6666

0.4000

0.3333

0.2500

0.6666

0.7500

0.1111

0.6000

0.5000

0.7500

0.1111

0.1250

0.4444

0.8000

0.6667

0.1250

0.4444

0.6250

0.7778

0.0400

0.8333

0.6250

0.7778

Table 2.2: Three columns of sample points generated from Halton and Hammersely
sequences of 6 points
Halton sequence (6 points)

Hamersely sequence (6 points)

Column 1

Column 2

Column 3

Column 1

Column 2

Column 3

0.5000

0.3333

0.2000

0.1429

0.5000

0.3333

0.2500

0.6666

0.4000

0.2857

0.2500

0.6666

0.7500

0.1111

0.6000

0.4286

0.7500

0.1111

0.1250

0.4444

0.8000

0.5714

0.1250

0.4444

0.6250

0.7778

0.0400

0.7143

0.6250

0.7778

0.3750

0.2222

0.2400

0.8571

0.3750

0.2222
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It is found that when additional points are added, the former data points generated
from Halton sequence remain the same, whereas the former data points generated from
Hammersely sequence are changed. This means that the sample points generated from the
Hammersely sequence are changed from one iteration to the next. Therefore, when solving
model updating problems (which will be discussed in chapter 3), sample points generated
by Halton sequence in a previous iteration can be reused, and only the newly generated
sample points are considered to be added into the previous model. When using a
Hammersely sequence method to solve model-updating problems, the model needs to be
re-built because the data points in previous iterations are changed when new points are
added.
In this chapter, the linear regression model that is generated from both traditional DOE
method and the low-discrepancy sequence method is discussed in the contest of solution to
a pressure vessel problem.

2.4 Numerical example
A numerical example is presented in this chapter to compare the results obtained using
traditional DOE-RSM method and the low-discrepancy sequence data point generatingRSM method.

2.4.1 Pressure vessel problem
This problem had been used as a test problem in the literature by some researchers (Rao
et al. 1997, Lewis and Mistree 1998, Marston 2000, Ghotbi 2013). Consider the pressure
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vessel in Fig 2.1, there are three design variables in this problem, the radius of the pressure
vessel R, the length L and the wall thickness T.

Figure 2.1: Pressure vessel design problem
Two objective functions are considered: maximizing the volume (VOL) and
minimizing the weight (WGT) of the vessel. Player 1 (VOL) wishes to maximize the
volume by controlling variables R and L whereas player 2 (WGT) wishes to minimize the
weight with control over variable T. The vessel is under internal pressure P. The problem
constraints include: (i) the circumferential stress in the wall should not exceed the tensile
stress, and (ii) some additional geometric constraints due to space limitations. These
constraints are given in Eqns. (2.1)- (2.4).
𝜎𝑐𝑖𝑟𝑐 =

𝑃𝑅
≤ 𝑆𝑡
𝑇

(2.1)

5𝑇 − 𝑅 ≤ 0

(2.2)

𝑅 + 𝑇 − 40 ≤ 0

(2.3)

𝐿 + 2𝑅 + 2𝑇 − 150 ≤ 0

(2.4)

The objective functions of the problems for players VOL and WGT are given in Eqns.
17

(2.5) and (2.8) respectively.
For Player VOL:
4
𝑀𝑖𝑛 𝑓1 = −𝑉(𝑅, 𝐿) = −𝜌 [ 𝜋𝑅 3 + 𝜋𝑅 2 𝐿]
3

(2.5)

by varying R, L
subject to Eqns. (2.1)-(2.4)
𝑅𝑙 ≤ 𝑅 ≤ 𝑅𝑢

(2.6)

𝐿𝑙 ≤ 𝐿 ≤ 𝐿𝑢

(2.7)

For player WGT:
4

4

(2.8)

𝑀𝑖𝑛 𝑓2 = 𝑊(𝑅, 𝑇, 𝐿) = 𝜌 [3 𝜋(𝑅 + 𝑇)3 + 𝜋(𝑅 + 𝑇)2 𝐿 − (3 𝜋𝑅 3 +
𝜋𝑅 2 𝐿)]
by varying T
subject to Eqns. (2.1)- (2.4)

(2.9)

𝑇𝑙 ≤ 𝑇 ≤ 𝑇𝑢

where 𝜌 is the cylinder material density and 𝑅𝑙 , 𝑅𝑢 , 𝐿𝑙 , 𝐿𝑢 , 𝑇𝑙 , 𝑇𝑢 denote the lower and upper
bounds on radius, length and thickness of the pressure vessel respectively. The problem
parameters are given in Table 2.3.
Table 2.3: Parameters of the pressure vessel
𝑃(𝑙𝑏)

𝑆𝑡 (𝑙𝑏)

3890

35000

𝜌(

𝑙𝑏𝑠
)
𝑖𝑛3

0.283

𝐿𝑙 (𝑖𝑛)

𝐿𝑢 (𝑖𝑛)

𝑅𝑙 (𝑖𝑛)

𝑅𝑢 (𝑖𝑛)

𝑇𝑙 (𝑖𝑛)

𝑇𝑢 (𝑖𝑛)

0.1

140

0.1

36

0.5

6
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The Nash solution for this problem was derived analytically by Rao et al. (1997) and
is given by Eqns. (2.10)- (2.12).
𝑆𝑡 (150 − 𝐿𝑢 )
40𝑆𝑡
≤ 𝑅𝑁 ≤
2(𝑃 + 𝑆𝑡 )
𝑃 + 𝑆𝑡

(2.10)

𝑃
𝐿𝑁 = 150 − 2𝑅 𝑁 ( + 1)
𝑆

(2.11)

𝑃𝑅 𝑁
𝑇 =
𝑆𝑡

(2.12)

𝑁

where 𝑅 𝑁 , 𝐿𝑁 , 𝑇 𝑁 denote the Nash solutions of the radius, length and thickness of this
problem respectively.
Ghotbi (2013) mentioned that changing the initial point for the radius resulted in a
different Nash solution which means that there are multiple Nash solutions for this problem.
The traditional RSM-DOE based method is unable to provide all Nash solutions to this
problem. However, in this chapter it is demonstrated how to low-discrepancy sequence
based RSM is able to generate all possible Nash solutions.
According to Marston (2000), 3 level 2 factor (leader level design variables R, L)
CCD for follower player WGT, 9 basic data points with 5 repeating points at center (20.25,
55) (See 9 CCD points map in Fig 2.2).
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Figure 2.2. 9 point CCD map
The application of low-discrepancy sequence method started from 14 randomly generated
points. Table 2.4 and Table 2.5 shows the 14 data points generated from the Halton
sequence and Hammersely sequence respectively.
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Table 2.4: R, L computed according to 2 columns of 14 Halton points
Generated points
0.5
0.333333333
0.25
0.666666667
0.75
0.111111111
0.125
0.444444444
0.625
0.777777778
0.375
0.222222222
0.875
0.555555556
0.0625 0.888888889
0.5625 0.037037037
0.3125
0.37037037
0.8125 0.703703704
0.1875 0.148148148
0.6875 0.481481481
0.4375 0.814814815

R
20.25
12.375
28.125
8.4375
24.1875
16.3125
32.0625
6.46875
22.21875
14.34375
30.09375
10.40625
26.15625
18.28125

L
40
70
20
50
80
30
60
90
13.33333333
43.33333333
73.33333333
23.33333333
53.33333333
83.33333333

T
2.250642857
1.375392857
3.125892857
0.937767857
2.688267857
1.813017857
3.563517857
0.718955357
2.469455357
1.594205357
3.344705357
1.156580357
2.907080357
2.031830357

Table 2.5: R, L computed according to 2 columns of 14 Hammersely points
Generated Points
0.066666667
0.5
0.133333333
0.25
0.2
0.75
0.266666667 0.125
0.333333333 0.625
0.4
0.375
0.466666667 0.875
0.533333333 0.0625
0.6
0.5625
0.666666667 0.3125
0.733333333 0.8125
0.8
0.1875
0.866666667 0.6875
0.933333333 0.4375

R
6.6
8.7
10.8
12.9
15
17.1
19.2
21.3
23.4
25.5
27.6
29.7
31.8
33.9
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L
55
32.5
77.5
21.25
66.25
43.75
88.75
15.625
60.625
38.125
83.125
26.875
71.875
49.375

T
0.733542857
0.966942857
1.200342857
1.433742857
1.667142857
1.900542857
2.133942857
2.367342857
2.600742857
2.834142857
3.067542857
3.300942857
3.534342857
3.767742857

To make a comparison between the distribution of points used to generate the response
surface using CCD and low-discrepancy method, Fig 2.3 and Fig 2.4 show the 14 points
generated using the Hammersely method and the 14 points generated using the Halton
method respectively.

Figure 2.3: 14 points Hammersely sequence map
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Figure 2.4: 14 points Halton sequence map

In the lower level (or the follower problem), the radius R and the length L are
considered as parameters. Thus R and L values in Table 2.4 and 2.5 are computed by Eqns.
(2.13) and (2.14) as:
𝑅 = 𝑅𝐿 + (𝑅𝑈 − 𝑅𝐿 )𝑥1𝑖

(2.13)

𝐿 = 𝐿𝐿 + (𝐿𝑈 − 𝐿𝐿 )𝑥2𝑖

(2.14)

where 𝐿𝑈 = 100 𝑖𝑛, 𝑅𝑈 = 36 𝑖𝑛, 𝐿𝐿 = 10 𝑖𝑛, 𝑅𝐿 = 4.5 𝑖𝑛 denote the highest and lowest
value selected for the length and radius in the experiment, 𝑥1𝑖 , 𝑥2𝑖 denote the generated
points in each column.
The fifth column in both Table 2.4 and Table 2.5 shows the optimum solution for T
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from each combination of (R, L) according to equation (2.12).
The linear regression for T(R, L) according to 14 point Hammersely sequence is
obtained as Eqn. (2.15)
𝑇(𝑅, 𝐿) = 0.111142857142857𝑅 − 0.000000000142855

(2.15)

Since the discrepancy in coefficients between each set of experiment is very small,
while computing the response surface equation, the coefficients in Eqn. (2.15) are retained
in long format.
Here, T(R, L) approximated the optimum vector of WGT problem for varying values
of R and L. Repeating the above steps for the VOL problem yields the Rational Reaction
Set (RRS) for variables R and L as follows:
𝑅(𝑇) = 8.997429304946937𝑇 + 0.000000002402726

(2.16)

𝐿(𝑇) = −19.9948586173061𝑇 + 150.0000000136055

(2.17)

Comparing this result with the one reported by Marston (2000) 𝑇(𝑅, 𝐿) =
−0.00021 + 0.1112𝑅, 𝑅(𝑇) = 9𝑇, 𝐿(𝑇) = 150 − 20𝑇, there are only some very small
perturbations in the coefficients. However, the Nash solutions: 𝑅 = 24.4496, 𝐿 =
95.6859, 𝑇 = 2.7164, obtained based on the three RRS computed in this chapter is quite
a bit different compared to 𝑅 = 28.44, 𝐿 = 86.8 𝑇 = 3.16 reported by Marston (2000).
Since it was already known from Ghotbi (2013) that the Nash solution for this pressure
vessel problem is not unique, and DOE based RSM at that time was not able to find all
Nash solutions. To verify if this is one of the possible Nash solutions and if the new DOE
method can be applied to find all Nash solutions, the study continued.
By reducing the number of initial experiment data points from 14 to 9, repeating the
steps above, 6 sets of Nash solutions were obtained by Hammersely sequence method and
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6 sets of Nash solutions were obtained by Halton sequence method. They are shown in
Table 2.6 and Table 2.7 respectively.

Table 2.6: 6 sets of Nash solutions obtained by Hammersely sequence method
Number of data points

T (in)

R (in)

L (in)

14

1.1581

10.4203

126.8430

13

2.4152

21.7306

101.7083

12

2.6796

24.1099

96.4210

11

1.2942

11.6448

124.1219

10

3.8795

34.9051

72.4308

9

1.6417

14.7707

117.1753

Table 2.7: 6 sets of Nash solutions obtained by Halton sequence method
Number of data points

T (in)

R (in)

L (in)

14

2.7164

24.4406

95.6859

13

1.4540

13.0826

120.9266

12

2.0281

18.2480

109.4476

11

4.3221

38.8875

63.5809

10

2.9451

26.4987

91.1124

9

3.1781

28.5945

86.4549

The results given in Table 2.6 and Table 2.7 are plotted in 4 charts shown below.
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Figure 2.5: Thickness versus radius using Hammersely sequence

Figure 2.6: Length versus radius using Hammersely sequence
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Figure 2.7: Thickness versus radius using Halton sequence

Figure 2.8: Length versus radius using Halton sequence
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Ghotbi (2013) proposed a sensitivity based approach to solve this problem and
successfully found all Nash solutions as shown in Fig 2.9 and Fig 2.10.

Figure 2.9: Nash solution found by Ghotbi (thickness versus radius)

Figure 2.10: Nash solution found by Ghotbi (length versus radius)
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Comparing the 2 sets of figures in this chapter with the 2 figures plotted by Ghotbi
(2013), a conclusion was drawn that by varying the numbers of data points of the lowdiscrepancy sequence, all Nash solutions of the pressure vessel problem can be found.

2.5 Conclusions
This chapter demonstrated how to apply low-discrepancy sequence method based
RSM to find Nash solution for a design optimization problems. From the results of the
numerical example in this chapter, it is obvious that the low-discrepancy sequence method
has a lot of advantages compared to the traditional DOE method.
Firstly, less data points are needed to build a relatively accurate response surface
model by using low-discrepancy sequence method.
Secondly, the results of the numerical example shows that it is possible to find all
Nash solutions for the design optimization problems when the Nash solution is not a
singleton. Similarly, by adding or reducing the repeated points at the center of the CCD
experiment dose not help to find all Nash solutions for the pressure vessel problem.
Thirdly, unlike the traditional DOE method where the number of data points is fixed
by the number of factors and their levels in the experiment, the low-discrepancy sequence
method offers the convenience that the experiment can be started from any proper number
of data points.
Since the Nash solutions for the pressure vessel problem were analytically available,
there was no need to do model updating. To further illustrate the efficiency of the lowdiscrepancy sampling method, the next chapter discusses how to realize model updating
using this method.
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Chapter 3. Model updating using low discrepancy
sampling
In the pressure vessel design problem discussed in previous chapter, a linear numerical
regression model was used to approximate the response surface. In this chapter, another
numerical example is discussed to demonstrate utilization of low-discrepancy sequence
method based RSM to realize model updating and solve the design optimization problem.

3.1 Basic concept of model updating
Generally in the DOE method, the study of numerical regression starts from the first
order model in the form of Eqn. (3.1).
𝑛

𝑦̃ = 𝑎0 + ∑ 𝑎𝑗 𝑥𝑗

(3.1)

𝑗=1

To make the generated response surface more accurate and closer to the real case, the
model may need to be updated. The model updated should be as simple as possible while
giving reasonably accurate results. Two types of second order models, the pure quadratic
model and the full quadratic model in the form of Eqn. (3.2) and Eqn. (3.3) respectively
are used frequently.
𝑛

𝑛

𝑦̃ = 𝑎0 + ∑ 𝑎𝑗 𝑥𝑗 + ∑ 𝑎𝑗𝑗 𝑥𝑗2
𝑗=1
𝑛

𝑗=1
𝑛

𝑛

𝑦̃ = 𝑎0 + ∑ 𝑎𝑗 𝑥𝑗 + ∑ ∑ 𝑎𝑖𝑗 𝑥𝑖 𝑥𝑗
𝑗=1

(3.2)

(3.3)

𝑗=1 𝑖=1

Generally, the more accurate the model, the better is the optimal solution obtained,
however, this requires more data points in the DOE formulation.
As discussed before, because of the exponential relationship between the number of
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data points and the number of levels used in the experimental design, sometimes it can be
very hard to realize model updating using traditional DOE based methods. Even if it is
possible to conduct a numerical experiment and add more data points to realize model
updating, it may be difficult to implement in many problems because of an exponential
increase in number of trials required when a level is added and the additional experiments
can cost lot of money and take a lot of time.

3.2 Model updating using low-discrepancy sequence method
In section 2.4, several advantages of the low-discrepancy sequence method were
reported. This chapter introduces one more advantage of low-discrepancy sequence method
that when trying to update the regression model, any number of data points can be added
into the model.
The basic idea of utilizing low-discrepancy sequence method for model updating is to
take advantage of its flexibility. If the original model fails to meet the desired accuracy
expected of the response surface, it is easy to go back to the data point generating step, and
add one more data point to the experiment, and then check if the new regression model fits
the actual model better. Repeat these steps until the response surface model fits the actual
process accurately. Using this model to find the solution for the design optimization
problem is expected to yield improved solutions. These steps are summarized in the
flowchart given in Figure 3.1.
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Start

Design the experiment

Choose proper number of data points needed
in the experiment

Add 1
more data
point

Generate a number of data points using lowdiscrepancy sampling

No

Dose the
regression
model capture
the response
accurately?
Yes

Generate the regression model

Dose the regression
model fit the actual
function

No

Update
the
model

Yes
Use this model to solve the problem

End
Figure 3.1: Flow chart of model updating using low-discrepancy sequence method
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3.3 Numerical example
A numerical example is presented in this chapter to demonstrate how to apply lowdiscrepancy sampling method to update the RSM model and solve the design optimization
problem under consideration.

3.3.1 Two-bar truss design problem
Azarm and Li (1990) discussed the bi-level optimization problem which is shown in
Fig. 3.2.

C

100 kN
Figure 3.2: Two-bar truss design problem

A vertical load of 100 KN is applied at point C. The design variables are the crosssectional areas of the bars 𝑥1 , 𝑥2 , and the y-coordinate of joint C. The problem constraints
include limitations on the stress in the elements, which should not exceed 100000 𝑘𝑁/𝑚2 ,
and the boundary conditions on vertical coordinate (y). The objective function is to
minimize the total volume of the two members as shown in Eqn. (3.4).
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𝑀𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑚𝑖𝑧𝑒 𝑓(𝑥1 , 𝑥2 , 𝑦) = 𝑥1 (16 + 𝑦 2 )0.5 + 𝑥2 (1 + 𝑦 2 )0.5
subject to:
20(16 + 𝑦 2 )0.5 − 100000𝑦𝑥1 ≤ 0
80(1 + 𝑦 2 )0.5 − 100000𝑦𝑥2 ≤ 0
1≤𝑦≤3
𝑥1 , 𝑥2 > 0

(3.4)

Azarm and Li (1990) decomposed this problem into two levels. Level 1 is the follower
problem, with two players, Player 1 and Player 2, who have control over variables 𝑥1 and
𝑥2 respectively. Level 2 is the leader problem with Player 3 who has control over variable
𝑦.
The follower level problems are given as:
𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑚𝑖𝑧𝑒 𝑓1 (𝑥1 , 𝑦) = 𝑥1 (16 + 𝑦 2 )0.5
𝑥1
𝑠𝑢𝑏𝑗𝑒𝑐𝑡 𝑡𝑜:
20(16 + 𝑦 2 )0.5 − 100000𝑦𝑥1 ≤ 0
𝑥1 > 0

(3.5)

𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑚𝑖𝑧𝑒 𝑓2 (𝑥2 , 𝑦) = 𝑥2 (1 + 𝑦 2 )0.5
𝑥2
𝑠𝑢𝑏𝑗𝑒𝑐𝑡 𝑡𝑜:
80(1 + 𝑦 2 )0.5 − 100000𝑦𝑥2 ≤ 0
𝑥2 > 0

(3.6)

The leader problem is given as:

minimize f  x1 , x2 , y   f1  x1 , y   f 2  x2 , y 
y
subject to:
1 y  3

(3.7)
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This problem can be modeled as a Stackelberg game with two players in the follower
level. Using the principles of monotonicity analysis, it can be verified that the constraints
are active at optimum solution of the follower problems when they are optimized
individually. The optimum solutions of follower problems are as follows:
x1*  y   20 16  y 2  / 100,000 y 

(3.8)

x2*  y   80 1  y 2  / 100,000 y 

(3.9)

0.5

0.5

where 𝑥1∗ , 𝑥2∗ are the optimal solutions for the follower problems which are the closed-form
expressions of RRS for the followers. By substituting these RRS in the leader level, the
optimum solution of leader problem can be obtained.
Since there is a single factor y in the leader problem, the design of experiment became
simple. The traditional DOE based RSM method can just evenly divide the interval of y
[1,3], and use the same concept to update the model and solve the problem. The results of
three different types of models (linear, quadratic and cubic model) computed by both
Halton sequence and Hammersely sequence are shown in Table 3.1.

Table 3.1: Solutions obtained from low-discrepancy sequence method
Type

Linear model

𝑥2
𝑦

Hammers

Hammers
ely

2.5870𝑒 −4 2.5870𝑒 −4 4.1647𝑒 −4 4.1284𝑒 −4

4.4979𝑒 −4

4.4548𝑒 −4

7.9300𝑒 −4 2.5870𝑒 −4 8.7582𝑒 −4 8.7657𝑒 −4
3
3
2.1500
2.1621

8.9768𝑒 −4

8.9840𝑒 −4

1.9673

1.9973

ely

Halton
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Hammers
ely

Cubic model
Halton

Halton
Variables
𝑥1

Quadratic model

Comparing the solution reported by Azarm and Li (2000) ( 𝑥1 = 4.48𝑒 −4 , 𝑥2 =
8.96𝑒 −4 , 𝑦 = 2) and the solution reported by Ghotbi (2013) ( 𝑥1 = 4.49𝑒 −4 , 𝑥2 =
8.95𝑒 −4 , 𝑦 = 1.9981), with the cubic model solution in this thesis, it is seen that cubic solution
given in Table 3.1 is the most accurate one among the three pairs of the solutions obtained
from the low-discrepancy sequence method. This simple example shows that the lowdiscrepancy sequence method can be considered as an effective way to update regression
models.

3.3.2 Enhanced version of the Two- bar truss problem
Since there was only one leader design variable in problem 3.3.1, only one factor was
considered while designing the experiment. When updating the model, it can be easily set
up by using the traditional DOE method which involves dividing y into evenly spaced
intervals and reducing the interval size to accommodate more data points to the experiment.
Thus, an additional problem is considered here, by adding two more leader design variables
𝑦1 , 𝑦2 into the problem (See Fig. 3.3).

𝑦1

𝑦2

100 kN
Figure 3.3: Enhanced two-bar truss problem
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The new objective function becomes as follows:
𝑀𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑚𝑖𝑧𝑒 𝑓(𝑥1 , 𝑥2 , 𝑦1 , 𝑦2 , 𝑦) = 𝑥1 [16 + (𝑦 − 𝑦1 )2 ]0.5 + 𝑥2 [1 + (𝑦 − 𝑦2 )2 ]0.5
subject to:
20(16 + (𝑦 − 𝑦1 )2 )0.5 − 100000(𝑦 − 𝑦1 )𝑥1 ≤ 0
80(1 + (𝑦 − 𝑦2 )2 )0.5 − 100000(𝑦 − 𝑦2 )𝑥2 ≤ 0
1≤𝑦≤3
0 ≤ 𝑦1 , 𝑦2 ≤ 0.5
𝑥1 , 𝑥2 > 0

(3.10)

So the optimum solution for 𝑥1 and 𝑥2 change to:
𝑥1∗ (𝑦1 , 𝑦) = 20[16 + (𝑦 − 𝑦1 )2 ]0.5 /100,000(𝑦 − 𝑦1 )

(3.11)

𝑥𝑥∗ (𝑦2 , 𝑦) = 80[1 + (𝑦 − 𝑦2 )2 ]0.5 /100,000(𝑦 − 𝑦2 )

(3.12)

The response surface according to the optimum solution 𝑥1 and 𝑥2 are shown in Fig
3.4 and Fig 3.5 respectively.

Figure 3.4: Response surface of 𝑥1∗ (𝑦1 , 𝑦)
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Figure 3.5: Response surface of 𝑥2∗ (𝑦2 , 𝑦)
An 8 point Hammersely sequence was generated to solve this problem. The linear
regression model of the follower level were computed as follow:
𝑥1 = 1.0408𝑒 −3 + 3.5073𝑒 −4 𝑦1 − 2.9518𝑒 −4 𝑦

(3.13)

𝑥2 = 1.2843𝑒 −3 + 1.8183𝑒 −4 𝑦2 − 1.8186𝑒 −4 𝑦

(3.14)

Substitute this solution into the leader problem. The solution of the global design
problem 𝑦 = 3, 𝑦1 = 0, 𝑦2 = 0, 𝑥1 = 1.5527𝑒 −4 , 𝑥2 = 7.3872𝑒 −4 was obtained.
To verify if the solution is indeed the correct solution to this problem, a sensitivity
based approach was applied, and 𝑦 = 2.0029, 𝑦1 = 0, 𝑦2 = 0.5, 𝑥1 = 4.4670𝑒 −4 , 𝑥2 =
9.6092𝑒 −4 was obtained as the solution to this problem.
The solution obtained from the first order model is not the same as the solution
obtained with the sensitivity based approach, which means the model needs to be updated.
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Since it is unknown if additional data points are necessary, the Hammersely sequence
was retained in the form of 8 points for the continued study of model updating. The
solutions obtained from full quadratic model and full cubic model are shown in Table 3.2.

Table 3.2: Solutions obtained from 8 point Hammersely sequence
Model

Quadratic model

Cubic model

𝑦

2.1501

2.1003

𝑦1

0

0

𝑦2

0.3291

0.4938

𝑥1

4.1468𝑒 −4

4.4574𝑒 −4

𝑥2

9.1327𝑒 −4

9.3734𝑒 −4

Variables

As is shown in the Table 3.2, the solution obtained from the cubic model is very close
to the solution obtained from the sensitivity based approach. If more accurate solutions are
desired, 2 methods can be applied: 1) increase the model order, 2) add more data points to
the full cubic model. Considering the number of computations needed in formulating a 4th
order regression equation, the second method was adopted here.
When the number of data points was increased to be 11, a set of solution that met the
tolerance requirement of 𝜀 ≤ 0.001 was obtained, this solution can be viewed as the
optimum solution for this problem (See Table 3.3)
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Table 3.3: Hammersely and Halton 11 point solution versus sensitivity based approach
Hammersely 11
points cubic model

Halton 11 points
cubic model

Sensitivity based
approach

𝑦

2.0023

2.0026

2.0029

𝑦1

0

0

0

𝑦2

0.4998

0.4999

0.5

𝑥1

4.4670𝑒 −4

4.4670𝑒 −4

4.4670𝑒 −4

𝑥2

9.5991𝑒 −4

9.6000𝑒 −4

9.6092𝑒 −4

Method
Variables

According to the result obtained from the 11 point Hammersely and Halton sequence,
the low-discrepancy sequence method is an effective tool in model updating study, and can
be considered as an effective method in solving design optimization problems.
The traditional DOE based RSM was also considered in this problem. A 3 factor 2
level experiment with 8 points was designed to solve this problem. However, the full cubic
model result (𝑦 = 2.4378, 𝑦1 = 0, 𝑦2 = 0.1844, 𝑥1 = 7.8850𝑒 −4 , 𝑥2 = 10.9114𝑒 −4 ) was
far away from the exact solution. The reason that this result cannot be trusted is that the 8
points in a 2 level traditional design experiment are way too dispersed compared to the
low-discrepancy sequence method. Thus, more data points are required in the traditional
DOE approach. To update the numerical model using the traditional DOE method, 1 more
level is required which means the data points need to be increased from 8 points to 27
points. On the other hand, an 11 point low-discrepancy sequence can give a very accurate
solution.
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3.4 Conclusions
In this chapter, the two-bar truss design problem was considered as a test problem to
demonstrate one factor experiment-model updating. The second numerical example, which
has three leader design variables, is a modified version of the two-bar truss problem. In this
case, the traditional DOE method was not able to realize model updating by adding data
points to the experiment one by one.
When the factors in the experiment were increased to be 3 or more, the traditional
DOE method was inapplicable in this case. From the result of the second numerical
example, it is seen that the low-discrepancy sequence method is a fast and effective way to
update the regression model when dealing with multiple factors. Since the sample points
generated using low-discrepancy sequences are uniformly distributed throughout the
solution space, the underlying response surface is reasonably accurate.
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Chapter 4. Multi-level optimum design based on
Decentralized and Hierarchical models

This chapter presents an application of sensitivity based approach to solving multilevel design optimization problems. Two types of multi-level problems are considered in
this chapter. The first one is the decentralized case, wherein the multiple objective functions
are considered as two groups, with one (or more) objectives in the leader group and one
(or more) objectives in the follower group. Two solution scenarios are considered. In the
first scenario, the behavior in each group is considered as a cooperative game, and the
interaction between the leader and follower group is considered as a Stackelberg Game. In
the second scenario, at the lower level, the interactions between the players are considered
as a non-cooperative Nash game while at the leader level the interactions between the
players remains a cooperative game. The interaction between the two levels is still
considered as a Stackelberg game.
In the second case, called the hierarchical mode, multiple objective functions are
considered as multiple levels from the highest to the lowest. This means there is a
hierarchical order of the leaders and followers in this mode. To find the solution to this
situation, the interaction between each set of players is considered as a Stackelberg game.

4.1 Decentralized mode
Consider a bi-level decentralized game with 4 players in the game for example (See
Fig 4.1). The 4 players represent their own objective functions 𝑓1 , 𝑓2 , 𝑓3 , 𝑓4 respectively.
Player 1 and player 2 are considered as leader players in Level 1, player 3 and player 4 are
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considered as follower players in Level 2.
Level 1

Cooperative

Player 1 𝑓1

Player 2 𝑓2

Stackelberg
Level 2

Player 3 𝑓3

Player 4 𝑓4
Nash/Cooperative

Figure 4.1: Bi-level 4 player decentralized model

The design optimization problem for the players is modeled as:
Leader level:
For player 1
𝑀𝑖𝑛 𝑓1 (𝑥1 , 𝑥2 , … 𝑥𝑖 ) 𝑥 ∈ 𝑅 𝑛
by varying the leader design variables
subject to 𝑔𝑗1 (𝑥1 , 𝑥2 , … 𝑥𝑖 ) ≤ 0 𝑗 = 1,2, … 𝑛𝑔1

(4.1)

For player 2
𝑀𝑖𝑛 𝑓2 (𝑥1 , 𝑥2 , … 𝑥𝑖 ) 𝑥 ∈ 𝑅 𝑛
by varying the leader design variables
subject to 𝑔𝑗2 (𝑥1 , 𝑥2 , … 𝑥𝑖 ) ≤ 0 𝑗 = 1,2, … 𝑛𝑔2

(4.2)

Follower level:
For player 3
𝑀𝑖𝑛 𝑓3 (𝑥1 , 𝑥2 , … 𝑥𝑖 ) 𝑥 ∈ 𝑅 𝑛
by varying the follower design variables
subject to 𝑔𝑗3 (𝑥1 , 𝑥2 , … 𝑥𝑖 ) ≤ 0 𝑗 = 1,2, … 𝑛𝑔3
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(4.3)

For player 4
𝑀𝑖𝑛 𝑓4 (𝑥1 , 𝑥2 , … 𝑥𝑖 ) 𝑥 ∈ 𝑅 𝑛
by varying the follower design variables
subject to 𝑔𝑗4 (𝑥1 , 𝑥2 , … 𝑥𝑖 ) ≤ 0 𝑗 = 1,2, … 𝑛𝑔4

(4.4)

There are two possible cases in a decentralized system, so two scenarios are
considered in this chapter, 1) the interactions between the objectives of both leader level
and follower level is considered as a cooperative game, the interaction between the leader
level and the follower level is considered as a Stackelberg game; 2) the interaction at the
follower level is considered as a Nash (Non-cooperative) game, the interaction at the leader
level is considered as a cooperative game, and the interaction between the two levels is a
Stackelberg game.

4.2 Hierarchical mode
Considering a three level with 3 players (See Fig 4.2). The 3 players represent their
own objective functions 𝑓1 , 𝑓2 , 𝑓3 respectively. The objective function 𝑓1 is considered as
the only leader player in the first level. The objective function 𝑓2 is considered as the first
follower player in the second level. The objective function 𝑓3 is considered as the second
follower player in the third level.
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Level 1

Player 1 𝑓1
Stackelberg

Level 2

Player 2 𝑓2
Stackelberg

Level 3

Player 3 𝑓3

Figure 4.2: Tri-level 3 player Hierarchical model
The design optimization problem for the players is modeled as:
First level:
For player 1
𝑀𝑖𝑛 𝑓1 (𝑥1 , 𝑥2 , … 𝑥𝑖 ) 𝑥 ∈ 𝑅 𝑛
by varying the leader design variables
subject to 𝑔𝑗1 (𝑥1 , 𝑥2 , … 𝑥𝑖 ) ≤ 0 𝑗 = 1,2, … 𝑛𝑔1

(4.5)

Second level:
For player 2
𝑀𝑖𝑛 𝑓2 (𝑥1 , 𝑥2 , … 𝑥𝑖 ) 𝑥 ∈ 𝑅 𝑛
by varying the leader design variables
subject to 𝑔𝑗2 (𝑥1 , 𝑥2 , … 𝑥𝑖 ) ≤ 0 𝑗 = 1,2, … 𝑛𝑔2

(4.6)

Third level:
For player 3
𝑀𝑖𝑛 𝑓3 (𝑥1 , 𝑥2 , … 𝑥𝑖 ) 𝑥 ∈ 𝑅 𝑛
by varying the follower design variables
subject to 𝑔𝑗3 (𝑥1 , 𝑥2 , … 𝑥𝑖 ) ≤ 0 𝑗 = 1,2, … 𝑛𝑔3
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(4.7)

Since in a hierarchical mode, all interactions between the neighboring levels are
considered as Stackelberg games, the first step to solve this kind of problem is to find the
Stackelberg solution for the lowest level (level 2 and level 3) as a function of higher levels
design variables, and then substitute this solution progressively, level by level, into higher
levels until we arrive at leader level for player 1. Finally, the complete solution to the
problem can be found by combining rational reaction sets of all lower level Stackelberg
problems.

4.3 Combined Decentralized and Hierarchical mode problem
In reality, a design problem may be more complicated where more factors in the
design need to be considered with more objectives conflicting with each other. For example,
imagine a design optimization problem that has 8 objectives to be optimized. More game
modes should be considered to find an optimum solution, which cannot be classified simply
as a decentralized mode or a hierarchical mode.
This thesis presents a solution for a new game structure which is a combination of the
decentralized and the hierarchical modes. Consider a design optimization problem with 4
players where player 1 in the first level is the leader for players 2, 3, 4, player 2 in the
second level is the leader for players 3, 4, players 3, 4 who stay at the third level are the
followers.
This problem can be modeled as a three-level game in which the interactions in each
level can be considered as either a Nash game or a cooperative game, the interaction of
each level to its preceding level is a Stackelberg game (See Fig 4.3).
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Player 1 𝑓1

Level 1

Stackelberg
Player 2 𝑓2

Level 2

Stackelberg
Player 3 𝑓3

Level 3

Player 4 𝑓4

Figure 4.3: Tri-level Decentralized-Hierarchical model
The design optimization problem can be formulated as:
First level:
For player 1
𝑀𝑖𝑛 𝑓1 (𝑥1 , 𝑥2 , … 𝑥𝑖 ) 𝑥 ∈ 𝑅 𝑛
by varying the leader design variables
subject to 𝑔𝑗1 (𝑥1 , 𝑥2 , … 𝑥𝑖 ) ≤ 0 𝑗 = 1,2, … 𝑛𝑔1

(4.8)

Second level
For player 2
𝑀𝑖𝑛 𝑓2 (𝑥1 , 𝑥2 , … 𝑥𝑖 ) 𝑥 ∈ 𝑅 𝑛
by varying the leader design variables
subject to 𝑔𝑗2 (𝑥1 , 𝑥2 , … 𝑥𝑖 ) ≤ 0 𝑗 = 1,2, … 𝑛𝑔2

(4.9)

Third level:
For player 3
𝑀𝑖𝑛 𝑓3 (𝑥1 , 𝑥2 , … 𝑥𝑖 ) 𝑥 ∈ 𝑅 𝑛
by varying the leader design variables
subject to 𝑔𝑗3 (𝑥1 , 𝑥2 , … 𝑥𝑖 ) ≤ 0 𝑗 = 1,2, … 𝑛𝑔3
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(4.10)

For player 4
𝑀𝑖𝑛 𝑓4 (𝑥1 , 𝑥2 , … 𝑥𝑖 ) 𝑥 ∈ 𝑅 𝑛
by varying the leader design variables
subject to 𝑔𝑗4 (𝑥1 , 𝑥2 , … 𝑥𝑖 ) ≤ 0 𝑗 = 1,2, … 𝑛𝑔4

(4.11)

To solve this problem, first step is to find the solution at the third level with the leader
design variables as parameters, then substitute the rational reaction set of the solutions into
the second level and finally, repeat above steps until the global solution to the problem can
be obtained.

4.4 Bargaining equation
The bargaining equation was applied to capture the cooperative behavior between the
players in the same level in a decentralized model. The bargaining equation is expressed
as:
𝑓𝐵 =

(𝑓𝑤1 − 𝑓1 )(𝑓𝑤2 − 𝑓2 ) … (𝑓𝑤𝑖 − 𝑓𝑖 )
(𝑓𝑤1 − 𝑓𝑏1 )(𝑓𝑤2 − 𝑓𝑏2 ) … (𝑓𝑤𝑖 − 𝑓𝑏𝑖 )

(4.12)

where 𝑓𝐵 denotes the bargaining function, 𝑓𝑖 are the values of the objective functions, 𝑓𝑤𝑖
is the worst solution for the 𝑓𝑖 and 𝑓𝑏𝑖 denotes the best solution for 𝑓𝑖 . It may be noted that
the 𝑓𝑏𝑖 is the optimized solution for the objective function 𝑓𝑖 and 𝑓𝑤𝑖 is the negative
optimized solution for −𝑓𝑖 (Assuming all the objective functions are in the standard form
that the target is to minimize the function).

4.5 Sensitivity based approach
The sensitivity based approach is considered as a fast and effective method for finding the
solutions to multi-level optimization design problems. The basic concept of the sensitivity
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based approach is to find how does the leader design variable change when varying the
follower design variable according to the sensitivity

𝑑𝑥𝑓∗
𝑑𝑥𝑙

. Use the sensitivity to find the

expression for the follower level solution:
𝑥𝑓 =

𝑥𝑓∗𝑘

𝑑𝑥𝑓∗𝑘
+
(𝑥𝑙 − 𝑥𝑙𝑘 )
𝑑𝑥𝑙

(4.13)

Substitute Eqn. (4.13) into the leader problem solve for 𝑥𝑙∗ in each iteration until the
𝑥𝑙∗ −𝑥𝑙𝑘

convergence tolerance |

𝑥𝑙𝑘

| meets the requirement yielding the solution to the problem

𝑥𝑙∗ , 𝑥𝑓∗ .
Here 𝑥 ∗ denotes the solution for the design variables, 𝑥𝑙 and 𝑥𝑓 are the leader design
variables and follower design variables respectively, 𝑘 is the iteration counter.
Hou et al. (2004) showed the general algorithm for an application of the sensitivity
based approach. Ghotbi (2013) demonstrated how to use sensitivity based approach to
obtain Stackelberg and Nash solution for optimization problems. Fig. 4.4 is the flow chart
of the procedure to obtain Stackelberg solution using sensitivity based approach.
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Assume initial value for
𝑥𝑙
Set 𝑘 = 1, 𝑥𝑙 = 𝑥𝑙𝑘

Solve the follower optimization problem to
obtain optimum values 𝑥𝑓∗𝑘 corresponding to 𝑥𝑙𝑘

Obtain sensitivity information
of follower problem

𝑥𝑙𝑘 = 𝑥𝑙∗
𝑘 =𝑘+1

Substitute 𝑥𝑓 = 𝑥𝑓∗𝑘 +

𝑑𝑥𝑓∗𝑘
𝑑𝑥𝑙

𝑑𝑥𝑓∗𝑘
𝑑𝑥𝑙

(𝑥𝑙 − 𝑥𝑙𝑘 )

into the leader problem

Solve the leader problem to obtain
optimum vector 𝑥𝑙∗

No

If |

𝑥𝑙∗ −𝑥𝑙𝑘
𝑥𝑙𝑘

|≤𝜀

Yes
𝑥𝑙∗ , 𝑥𝑓∗ are Stackelberg solutions

End

Figure 4.4: Flowchart of sensitivity based approach to obtain Stackelberg solution
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4.6 Numerical example
In this chapter, three numerical examples are presented to solve three types of multilevel problems. The first one is a decentralized type of optimization problem, the second
example is a hierarchical type of optimization problem, the third example is a combination
of decentralized and hierarchical optimization problem.

4.6.1 Decentralized optimization problem
To demonstrate the application of the sensitivity based approach to solving a
decentralized bi-level optimization problem, we consider a test problem which has been
solved by Liu (1998) using genetic algorithm.
The bi-level programming is formulated as follows:
For the leader level:
𝑚𝑖𝑛 𝐹(𝑥, 𝑦1 , 𝑦2 )
= (𝑦11 + 𝑦21 − 200)(𝑦11 + 𝑦21 ) + (𝑦12 + 𝑦22
(4.14)

− 160)(𝑦12 + 𝑦22 )
subject to
𝑥1 + 𝑥2 + 𝑥3 + 𝑥4 ≤ 40
0 ≤ 𝑥1 ≤ 10, 0 ≤ 𝑥2 ≤ 5, 0 ≤ 𝑥3 ≤ 15, 0 ≤ 𝑥4 ≤ 20
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For the follower level:
𝑚𝑖𝑛 𝑓3 (𝑦1 ) = (𝑦11 − 4)2 + (𝑦12 − 13)2
subject to
0.4𝑦11 + 0.7𝑦12 ≤ 𝑥1

(4.15)

0.6𝑦11 + 0.3𝑦12 ≤ 𝑥2
0 ≤ 𝑦11 , 𝑦12 ≤ 20

𝑚𝑖𝑛 𝑓4 (𝑦2 ) = (𝑦21 − 35)2 + (𝑦22 − 2)2
subject to
0.4𝑦21 + 0.7𝑦22 ≤ 𝑥3

(4.16)

0.6𝑦21 + 0.3𝑦22 ≤ 𝑥4
0 ≤ 𝑦11 , 𝑦12 ≤ 40

The leader problem was decomposed into two levels with player 1 𝑓1 (𝑥, 𝑦1 ) and
player 2 𝑓2 (𝑥, 𝑦2 ), and the objective functions in the leader level can be formulated as:
Player 1
𝑚𝑖𝑛 𝑓1 (𝑥, 𝑦1 , 𝑦2 ) = (𝑦11 + 𝑦21 − 200)(𝑦11 + 𝑦21 )
subject to
𝑥1 + 𝑥2 + 𝑥3 + 𝑥4 ≤ 40
0 ≤ 𝑥1 ≤ 10, 0 ≤ 𝑥2 ≤ 5, 0 ≤ 𝑥3 ≤ 15, 0 ≤ 𝑥4 ≤ 20
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(4.17)

Player 2
𝑚𝑖𝑛 𝑓2 (𝑥, 𝑦1 , 𝑦2 ) = (𝑦12 + 𝑦22 − 160)(𝑦12 + 𝑦22 )
subject to
𝑥1 + 𝑥2 + 𝑥3 + 𝑥4 ≤ 40

(4.18)

0 ≤ 𝑥1 ≤ 10, 0 ≤ 𝑥2 ≤ 5, 0 ≤ 𝑥3 ≤ 15, 0 ≤ 𝑥4 ≤ 20

Therefore, the overall problem was modeled as a decentralized system.
Consider this problem in the first scenario of a decentralized mode problem with
player 1 and 2 in the leader level, player 3 and 4 in the follower level. In the first scenario,
the interaction between the players in a same level is considered as a cooperative game.
Thus, the bargaining equation are applied (The best and worst values for each objective
function are shown in Table 4.1):
For level 1:
(0 − 𝑓1 )(0 − 𝑓2 )
(0 − (−2775))(0 − (−4375))

(4.19)

(185 − 𝑓3 )(1229 − 𝑓4 )
(185 − 3.7556)(1229 − 5.6889)

(4.20)

𝑓𝐵1 =
For level 2:
𝑓𝐵2 =
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Table 4.1: Best and worst values for the objective function optimized individually
Objective function

Best value

Worst value

𝑓1

-2775

0

𝑓2

-4375

0

𝑓3

3.7556

185

𝑓4

5.6889

1229

Thus the optimization problem can be re-written as:
Level 1

min −𝑓𝐵1

Level 2

min −𝑓𝐵2

Subject to:
𝑥1 + 𝑥2 + 𝑥3 + 𝑥4 ≤ 40
0 ≤ 𝑥1 ≤ 10, 0 ≤ 𝑥2 ≤ 5, 0 ≤ 𝑥3 ≤ 15, 0 ≤ 𝑥4 ≤ 20
0.4𝑦11 + 0.7𝑦12 ≤ 𝑥1
(4.21)

0.6𝑦11 + 0.3𝑦12 ≤ 𝑥2
0 ≤ 𝑦11 , 𝑦12 ≤ 20
0.4𝑦21 + 0.7𝑦22 ≤ 𝑥3
0.6𝑦21 + 0.3𝑦22 ≤ 𝑥4
0 ≤ 𝑦11 , 𝑦12 ≤ 40

Then, the interaction between level 1 and level 2 is considered as a Stackelberg game.
To solve this problem, the DOE-RSM approach was considered first, however, due to the
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constraints in this problem, an analytical solutions for the follower design variable in terms
of the leader design variables was not possible. Thus, it is impossible to design an
experiment of the follower level to generate the response surface. Therefore, the sensitivity
based approach that was introduced in this chapter was applied to solve this problem (See
results in Table 4.2).
Table 4.2: Solutions to the Decentralized mode example
Design variables and

Stackelberg-Cooperative

Liu (2000) Nash

objective functions

system result

equilibrium result

𝑥1

9.1114

7.05

𝑥2

5

3.13

𝑥3

10.3554

11.93

𝑥4

15.5331

17.89

(𝑦11 , 𝑦12 )

(2.5552,11.5562)

(0.26,9.92)

(𝑦21 , 𝑦22 )

(25.8885,0)

(29.82,0)

𝐹 = 𝑓1 + 𝑓2

-6095.1078

-5814.3352

𝑓3

4.1719

23.474

𝑓4

87.0185

30.8324

It can be seen from the table that the decentralized mode found a better optimum solution
for 𝐹 and 𝑓3 , but worse solution for 𝑓4 . Considering the leader objective function is the
main target to optimize, the cooperative mode in this problem can be viewed as a better
strategy than Nash equilibrium mode.
Now consider this problem in the second scenario such that the interaction at the lower
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level is a Nash game, the interaction at the leader level remains a cooperative game. Thus,
the first step to solve is to find the Nash solution for player 3 and 4, then substitute this
solution into the bargaining equation 𝑓𝑏1 in the leader level to find the Stackelberg solution
for the global problem (Table 4.3 shows the solution of this problem for the second scenario
in decentralized mode).
Table 4.3: Solution to the second scenario of the decentralized problem
Design variable and objective function

Stackelberg-Nash-Cooperative result

𝑥1

10

𝑥2

5

𝑥3

10

𝑥4

15

(𝑦11 , 𝑦12 )

(1.6667,13.333)

(𝑦21 , 𝑦22 )

(25,0)

𝐹 = 𝑓1 + 𝑓2

-6150

𝑓3

5.5556

𝑓4

104

Comparing the result from Table 4.3 with the result from Table 4.2, it can be seen
that the optimum value of the leader objective function obtained from the second
decentralized scenario is better optimized than the optimum value of the leader objective
function obtained from both the first decentralized scenario and Nash equilibrium by Liu
(2000).
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4.6.2 Hierarchical mode example
The second numerical example is also a test problem discussed by Liu (2000). This
problem was modeled with one leader player who has a control over three variables
(𝑥1 , 𝑥2 , 𝑥3 ) and three followers who have control vectors 𝑦 = (𝑦𝑖1 , 𝑦𝑖2 ), 𝑖 = 1,2,3. The
problem was formulated as:

Level 1:
𝑚𝑖𝑛 𝐹 (𝑥, 𝑦1 , 𝑦2 ) = −(𝑦11 𝑦12 𝑠𝑖𝑛𝑥1 + 𝑦21 𝑦22 𝑠𝑖𝑛𝑥2 + 𝑦31 𝑦32 𝑠𝑖𝑛𝑥3 )
(4.22)

subject to
𝑥1 + 𝑥2 + 𝑥3 ≤ 10, 𝑥1 , 𝑥2 , 𝑥3 ≥ 0

Level 2:
𝑚𝑖𝑛 𝑓1 = −(𝑦11 𝑠𝑖𝑛𝑦12 + 𝑦12 𝑠𝑖𝑛𝑦11 )
(4.23)

subject to
𝑦11 + 𝑦12 − 𝑥1 ≤ 0, 𝑦11 , 𝑦12 ≥ 0

Level 3:
𝑚𝑖𝑛 𝑓2 = −(𝑦21 𝑠𝑖𝑛𝑦22 + 𝑦22 𝑠𝑖𝑛𝑦21 )
(4.24)

subject to
𝑦21 + 𝑦22 − 𝑥2 ≤ 0, 𝑦21 , 𝑦22 ≥ 0
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Level 4:
𝑚𝑖𝑛 𝑓3 = −(𝑦31 𝑠𝑖𝑛𝑦32 + 𝑦32 𝑠𝑖𝑛𝑦31 )
(4.25)

subject to
𝑦31 + 𝑦32 − 𝑥3 ≤ 0, 𝑦31 , 𝑦32 ≥ 0

In the hierarchical system mode, player 1 is the leader for all the rest players, player
2 is the leader for player 3 and player 4, and player 3 is the leader for player 4. The
interaction between each level by each level was considered as a Stackelberg game. The
problem was solved using sensitivity based approach starting from level 4.
Liu (2000) considered this problem in a bi-level Nash-Stackerberg game mode that
the interactions between player 2, player 3, and player 4 were non-cooperative games in
the follower level, and the interaction between the leader player 1 and follower level was
considered as a Stackelberg game. Liu (2000) mentioned the Nash solution in this problem
is not unique. Thus, two of them were selected to make a comparison with the results from
the one obtained from the hierarchical mode (See Table 4.4).

58

Table 4.4: Solutions to the Hierarchical mode example
Variables and

Hierarchical mode

Nash-Stakelberg

Nash-Stackelberg

objectives

result

result from Liu(1)

result from Liu(2)

𝑥(𝑥1 , 𝑥2, 𝑥3 )

(1.9368,8.0632,0)

(1.946,8.054,0)

(8.054,1.946,0)

𝑦1 (𝑦11 𝑦12 )

(1.3132,6.7500)

(0.973,0.973)

(1.315,6.793)

𝑦2 (𝑦21 𝑦22 )

(0.9684,0.9684)

(1.315,6.793)

(0.973,0.973)

𝑦3 (𝑦31 𝑦32 )

(0,0)

(0,0)

(0,0)

𝐹

-9.5649

-9.566

-9.566

𝑓1

-7.1182

-1.609

-7.099

𝑓2

-1.5959

-7.099

-1.609

𝑓3

0

0

0

From the results shown in the table, it is found that although the Nash-Stackelberg
mode does not have a unique solution, the leader design variable 𝑥 have a control over the
leader objective function, the solution to the leader objective function is unique. Also, it is
found that in this problem, the result obtained from the hierarchical mode is very close to
the results from Nash-Stackelberg mode, which can be viewed as one set of NashStackelberg solution.

4.6.3 Decentralized-Hierarchical mode example
Consider a decentralized-hierarchical mode problem with player 1 𝑓1 with control
over 𝑥 = (𝑥1 , 𝑥2 ) in level 1, player 2 𝑓2 with control over 𝑦1 = (𝑦11 , 𝑦12 ) in level 2, player
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3 𝑓3 and player 4 𝑓4 who have control over 𝑦2 = (𝑦21 , 𝑦22 ) and 𝑦3 = (𝑦31 , 𝑦32 )
respectively in level 3. The problem is formulated as:
Level 1 (Player 1)
𝑚𝑖𝑛 𝑓1 (𝑥, 𝑦1 , 𝑦2 , 𝑦3 )
3(𝑦11 + 𝑦12 )2 + 5(𝑦21 + 𝑦22 )2 + 3(𝑦31 + 𝑦32 )2
=
2𝑥12 + 𝑥22 + 3𝑥1 𝑥2

(4.26)

subject to 𝑥1 + 2𝑥2 ≤ 10
𝑥1 , 𝑥2 > 0

Level 2 (Player 2)
2
2
𝑚𝑖𝑛 𝑓2 (𝑦1 ) = 𝑦11
+ 𝑦12

subject to 𝑦11 + 𝑦21 + 𝑦31 − 𝑥1 ≤ 0

(4.27)

𝑦12 + 𝑦22 + 𝑦32 − 𝑥2 ≤ 0
𝑦11 ≥ 1, 𝑦12 ≥ 2

Level 3(Player 3 and Player 4)
min 𝑓3 (𝑦2 ) = 𝑦21 + 𝑦22 +

𝑦11 𝑦12
+
𝑦21 𝑦22

subject to 𝑦21 , 𝑦22 > 0

min 𝑓4 (𝑦3 ) =

(4.28)

(𝑦31 − 𝑦21 )2 (𝑦32 − 𝑦22 )2
+
𝑦31
𝑦32

subject to 2𝑦31 + 3𝑦32 = 5
𝑦31 , 𝑦32 > 0
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(4.29)

This problem was modeled as a bi-level Stackelberg-Nash game by Liu (1998) and
solved by genetic algorithm. It was also considered as a 4-level hierarchical mode problem
by Ghotbi (2013) and solved by sensitivity based approach.
Now this problem is modeled as a Decentralized-Hierarchical problem. Consider a
cooperative game in the third level between player 3 and player 4, Stackelberg game
between level 3, level 2 and level 1. A cooperative game solution for the third level was
obtained by the bargaining equation first, and then the Stackelberg solutions for level 2 and
level 1 were obtained by sensitivity based approach. Table 4.5 showed the solution in this
thesis comparing with the Stackelberg-Nash solution from Liu (1998) and Hierarchical
solution from Ghotbi (2013).

Table 4.5: Decentralized-Hierarchical solution versus Decentralized solution and
Stackelberg-Nash solution
Decentralized-

Liu (1998)

Ghotbi (2013)

Hierarchical solution

solution

solution

𝑓1

1.5019

1.510

1.5831

𝑓2

5.6882

12.323

5

𝑓3

5.2436

6.225

5.335

𝑓4

0.7928

0.835

0.8736

𝑥 = (𝑥1 , 𝑥2 )

(4.3815,2.8092)

(5.768,2.116)

(4.3007,2.8497)

𝑦1 = (𝑦11 , 𝑦12 )

(1.2916,2.0000)

(2.885,2.000)

(1.000,2.000)

𝑦1 = (𝑦11 , 𝑦12 )

(1.6159,1.4140)

(1.699,1.414)

(2.0068,1.4142)

𝑦1 = (𝑦11 , 𝑦12 )

(1.4740,0.6840)

(1.183,0.878)

(0.8736,1.0843)
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From Table 4.5, it is seen that when comparing this solution with the solution reported
by Liu (1998), all four objective functions are better optimized. When comparing the
solution obtained in this thesis with the solution reported by Ghotbi (2013), all but 𝑓2 are
better optimized. Therefore, the new game based model proposed in this thesis here can be
viewed a better approach solving this multi-level problem.
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Chapter 5. Conclusions
The main objectives of this thesis can be classified into three areas: (1) To study
different methodologies to solve multi-objective design optimization problems including
the DOE-RSM based approaches as well as game theory based methods, (2) To develop a
new DOE based response surface method to solve the model updating problem in design
optimization, which uses low-discrepancy sequence to generate additional data points for
numerical regression, (3) To study two models for solving multi-level optimization
problems (Decentralized mode and Hierarchical mode) and solve the multi-level
optimization problems for these two different cases.

5.1 Model updating by low-discrepancy sequence method
Strictly speaking, the low-discrepancy sequence method based RSM is still a type of
DOE-RSM. The only thing distinguishing it from those traditional DOE method is the way
it generates the data points to establish the response surface. Using low-discrepancy
sequence method tactfully avoids the inconvenience of the restrictions on the number of
data points needed in conventional DOE based methods. Any proper number of data points
can be applied in a low-discrepancy sequence designed experiment, so if the regression
model does not fit the response surface, the model can be easily updated by adding any
number of data points to the existing total.
The advantages of the low-discrepancy sequence method based RSM compared with
the traditional DOE-RSM include:
1). The low-discrepancy sequence method can be used to update regression model by
adding as little as one data point to the initial model. The traditional DOE methods add
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additional points by adding levels, which means large number of data points may be needed.
In reality, the difficulty and cost of an experiment would increase significantly as additional
levels are added.
2). Although the low-discrepancy sequences are generated using a deterministic
numerical method, the points in the sequences can largely be viewed as random points.
Thus, the data points generated from low-discrepancy sequences are more representative
as samples distributed throughout the solution space, such that less data points generated
from low-discrepancy sequences would give more accurate solution to the problems
compared to data points generated from some other DOE method.
3). The initial number of data points to build a response surface model is generally
fixed by the number of the levels and factors in a traditionally designed experiment.
However, if applying a low-discrepancy sequence method to design the experiment it can
be started from any proper number of data points.
4). In chapter 2, for the pressure vessel design problem, it is found that sometimes the
Nash solution to a problem may not be singleton, and it is hard to use traditional DOE
method to find all Nash solutions. By easily changing the initial number of data points in
a low-discrepancy sequence based experiment, all Nash solutions can be obtained.
There may be additional advantages of this new DOE method that have not been found
yet. But also a deficiency of this method should be mentioned here. Same as all other DOE
methods so far, in some certain cases, the low-discrepancy sequence method is not able to
find solutions for the multi-level optimization design problems. The basic idea of applying
DOE-RSM to solve multi-level optimization design problems is to find the analytic
solution for the lower level problem, and design the experiment based on this solution to
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find the global solutions to the problem. If the analytic solutions cannot be obtained from
the constraints, it would be difficult to design an experiment to find the global solutions.
Besides, since the highest and lowest value of the factors in an experiment are decided by
the boundary conditions, it is necessary that the boundary conditions are given in the
problem. The solutions obtained from DOE-RSM sometimes turn out to violate the
constraints if the experiment is designed without proper consideration being given to
boundary conditions.

5.2 Game theory based multi-level optimization design problems
Different strategies are decided by different game modes in multi-level optimization
design problems. Roughly speaking, the game modes decide the weight of all the objective
functions in a multi-level design optimization problems. Thus, different solutions could be
obtained based on different strategies applied to a same problem.
Basically, there are three types of game modes that have been frequently used in the
literature review: Cooperative game, Non-cooperative (Nash) game and Stackelberg game.
Different combinations of these three game modes in a multi-level optimization design
problem make different systems. Two of them were discussed in chapter 4: Decentralized
mode and Hierarchical mode. One new combination was also proposed in chapter 4.
From the results of the first two numerical examples in chapter 4, it can be seen that
the solution to a same problem can be different when applying different game strategies.
Because different game strategies focus on different levels (or objective functions) in a
problem, it is difficult to tell which strategy is better when the objectives conflicting each
other. When applying another game strategy to a same multi-level optimization problem,
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some of the objective function values are better optimized while the rest may worse off. To
see if a game strategy is better than another for a same multilevel optimization problem,
one simple criteria that can be used is to check if the leader objective function value is
better optimized, meanwhile the follower objective function values should not exceed
certain percentage range of the solution obtained from the previous game strategy.
From the results obtained from the third numerical example, the new proposed
decentralized-hierarchical game mode is seen to be a better approach mode compared with
the previous ones used to solve that problem.

5.3 Scope of future work
The low-discrepancy sequence method discussed in this thesis has been proved to
solve optimization problems effeciently and effectively. One aspect of the future work
could be applying this method to design a real experiment where the objective function is
unknown and the range of the variables is the only given information. By generating the
sampling from the low-discrepancy sequence, response surface model can be built to find
the optimum solution.
On another aspect, as summarized, the applicability of the low-discrepancy sequence
method for multi-level optimization design problem greatly depends on the given
constraints and boundary conditions. Therefore, developing a new approach to use DOERSM in general cases regardless of the boundary conditions and the constraints is important
before this new method is generalized.
The multi-level design optimization problems discussed in this thesis were mostly bilevel or tri-level, such that the game combinations are very limited. To find more
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regularities and better strategies for multi-level optimization design problems, more
numerical examples need to be tested. Although the new game system was proposed in this
thesis seem to be advanced, more numerical examples are required to test it. Unfortunately,
the most majority of the numerical examples reported by previous researches are bi-level
problems. Thus, a third aspect of the future work of this thesis could be doing researches
on optimization problems with 4 or more levels based on hierarchical, decentralized
systems, or other systems that are comprised of one or more combinations of game theories.
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